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SANA CR[TICA: THE SYSTEM FOR WEIGHING
EVIDENCE UTILIZED BY THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Aharo Paid*
The Spanish version of the case law of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights often states that this tribunal's assessment of evidence is ruled by saia crilica, a notion
which has received several translations in the English version of the Court's case law. This concept has a clear meaning in the Hispanic civil law tradition. Sana critica is a
system for evaluating the weight of evidence whereby a
court or tribunal is not constrained by the evidentiary rules
of legal proo but must judge in accordance with the rules
of logic and experience, and state the grounds for its evaluation. For a better understanding of sana critica or sound
judicial discretion, this paper will refer to the other systems
used for the weighing of evidence in the Hispanic legal tradition, especially to the oft-loathed method of legal proof,
which requires the judge to give a previously defined
weight to specific items of evidence. Reference will be
made also to the differences between the systems used for
weighing evidence and other related concepts, such as the
standards of proof. The above description of the concept of
sana critica will be illuminated with some comments on
how the Inter-American Court applies this system.
INTRODUCTION

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights' usually states in the English

translation of its case law, that its assessment of evidence is governed by
* Chilean Lawyer, graduate of Unii'ersidad de los Andes (Chile), Master in Law
(MJur) from the University of Oxford, Philosophy Doctor candidate (PhD) at Trinity College Dublin. He was a British Council Chevening Scholar, 2008/09, a Visiting Professional at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2010), and an
intern at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2012). I am most
grateful to Prof. William Binchy and to Oscar Parra-Vera for their helpful suggestions and comments. E-mail: pauldiaa@tcd.ie.
I Hereinafter: "Inter-American Tribunal," "'Inter-Am. Ct. H.R .," "Court," or "Tribunal." This study, following the practice of the Inter-American Court, will use the
concepts "tribunal" and "court" as interchangeable.
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the rule or principle of "sound criticism," "competent analysis," "judgment
based on admissible evidence," "healthy criticism," "reasonable credit,"
"sound judgment," "'soundjudicial discretion," etc. 2 In contrast, the original
Spanish version of the Court's case law simply states that the Inter-Ameri3 The
can tribunal's assessment of evidence follows the rule of sana critica.
Court does not engage in providing any definition of this concept. At most,
it remarks that sana critica [sound judicial discretion 4] allows it to reach an
adequate decision.
This study will give an account of the meaning of sana crftica,
which is essentially the Hispanic expression referring to a system for evalu6
ating the weight of evidence according to the rules of logic and experience.
2

The Constitutional Court v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment. In-

ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No. 71,
49 (Jan. 31, 2001); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 79, 1 88 (Aug. 31, 2001): Baena-Ricardo v. Panama. Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.(ser. C) No. 72, 70 (Feb. 2. 2001): Case
of the 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109,
79 (July 5. 2004): G6mez-Palomino v.Peru,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136, T 50
(Nov. 22, 2005): Dacosta-Cadogan v. Barbados, Preliminary Objections. Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C No. 204, 35 (Sept.
24, 2009): Xfkmok Kdsek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits. Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214.
31-32 (Aug. 24.
2010). For two other translations see Almonacid-Arellano v.Chile, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C)
No. 154, 69 (Sept. 26, 2006) ("rules of reasonable credit and weight analysis"),
and Rochela Massacre v. Colombia , Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 163. 155 (May 11, 2007) ("principles of reasoned
judgment"). Case decisions of the Inter-American Court are available at: www.
corteidh.or.cr (in the "jurisprudence" section of the English version) (last visited
Apr. 17, 2012).
3 The different names given to this concept is probably due to the Court's lack of
a permanent office in charge of translating its case law. which may be, in turn, due
to the Tribunal's lack of' funding.
4
This translation of the concept sana critica illustrates best the content of this
notion, so it will be used in this study together with the original Spanish expression.
The expression valorar en consciencia [to evaluate according to one's conscience]
is a synonym of sana crltica. Joel GonzIcz Castillo. La Fundamentaciin de las
Sentencias v la Sana Critica,33 Ri-vis iA CHii.NA i DiR .('HO 93, 95 n.3 (2006).
5
See e.g., Mayagna (Suno) Awas Tingni Catv., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No.
79 at '1[
88; Baena-Ricardo,Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 72 at 70.
6
Some authors use the concept "evaluation" for referring to the action of weighing evidence. Sce, e.g.. Dinah L. Shelton, JudicialReview oJ'State Actions by Inter-
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Sana crftica resembles the way in which common law judges weigh
evidence.
The importance and relative novelty of sound judicial discretion in
the Latin American context can best be properly understood if this concept
is contrasted with the other Hispanic models for weighing evidence. The
reason why this article refers to a Hispanic civil law model is because there
are different procedural law systems within the civil law. Michele Taruffo
considers that there are three main civil law models-French, German and
Spanish-and some "mixed" systems.' The concept "Hispanic" will not
only be understood here as including the procedural model of Spain, but
also those of the nations which are heirs of the Spanish juridical systemmost of the countries under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. This concept would also include mixed systems that rely on
the Spanish model when dealing with the evaluation of the weight of
evidence.
The main object of this paper is to explain the system for weighing
evidence used by the Inter-American Court, and not to assess the way in
which this tribunal applies it. Nevertheless, this study will make several
commentaries about the Court's use of sana cr'tica, so it is necessary to
provide an overview of the Inter-American system of human rights.
This system was created within the context of the Organization of
American States ("OAS").' Its main human rights instruments are the 1948
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the 1969 Amer-

FORDIIAM INT'L L.J. 361, 392 (1989); B.G. Ramcharan,
Evidence, in INTIRNATIONAI LAW AND FACT FINDING IN TIlE FIELD OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 64, 79 (B. G. Ramcharan, ed., 1982). This study will not dwell on whether
these two concepts are synonyms. However, it will try to exclusively use the expression "weighing." Taruffo refers to what this study calls the "rules of logic and
experience" as the "commonsense rules of' reason and to the average experience of

national Courts, 12

the world." Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof"51 AM. J. COMP.

L. 659, 668 (2003). Despite the elegance and accuracy of the expression used by
Taruffo, this paper will use the wording "rules of logic and experience," since it
accords with the expression used by the Inter-American Court, and also because it
is a more literal translation of the traditional Hispanic wording.
I See Taruffo, supra note 6 at 660-61. These systems share many concepts.
8 For a description of this system, see HECTOR FACINDEZ LEDESMA, THE INTI-R
AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PR(OTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INSTITTFIONAL AND

PROCEDURAl. ASPECTS (Charles Moyer

trans.. 2008). http://www.iidh.ed.cr/Biblio

tecaWeb/Varios/Documentos/BD 125911109/interamerican protection-hr.pdf
(last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
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ican Convention of Human Rights. 9 The structure of the Inter-American
system resembles to some extent the European system in its early years of
existence, since there is a joint operation of a Commission and a Court of
Human Rights."' However, members of the OAS are under no obligation to
sign the American Convention or to grant compulsory jurisdiction to the
Court' -contrary to what is required from members of the Council of Europe. Therefore, some American States are subject to the jurisdiction of
both the Court and the Commission, while others are subject solely to the
latter.
The Inter-American Court was established by the American Convention as the competent organ for the protection of this treaty's wide catalogue of human rights, but there is no direct access for individuals to this
tribunal.' 2 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has issued around
one hundred and forty final judgments dealing with an extensive range of
matters.
I. PRELIMINARY ISSU-S

Before engaging in the task of explaining the concept of sana crftica to a reader familiar with the common law system, it is necessary to
stress that in a comparative study there is often no perfect correspondence
between concepts belonging to different jurisdictions. This difficulty may at
times give rise to some misunderstandings, which the reader should take
9 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948): American Convention of Human Rights [hereinafter "'American Convention"]. Nov. 22. 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. both reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN COURI
O

HUMAN

RiGtIis,

BASIC DOCIUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIlE IN-

FI:BRJARY 2011) at 19, 29. respectivel,.
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/libros/eng-docs20l l.pdf (last visited Apr. 17,
2011 ). There are also other OAS documents and treaties referring to human rights.
TER-AMERICAN

See

SYSTEM (UPDATED -I()

INTER-AMERICAN

COIRT OF HUMAN

RIGHTS. BASIC Docin\1FNTS PERTAINING

supra note 9, at 77ff.
10 The former is located in Washington D.C, and the latter in San Jos6 de Costa
Rica.
I Therefore, eleven of its thirty-five member States-which include all the independent Slales of the Americas-are not parties to the American Convention.
Among the member States to this treaty, "Itlwenty-one States Parties have accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. They are: ('osla Rica, Peru, Venezuela.
Honduras, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Suriname, Panama, Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Bolivia. El Salvador, Haiti, Brazil, Mexico. the
Dominican Republic and Barbados." Rep. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 2009, 2.
12 See American Convention, supra nole 9 at Art. 44.
1O HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYS'II-M
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into consideration. For instance, as it will be explained later, in a system of
sana crtica,the content of the expression "to weigh evidence" will be similar to that used by common law lawyers. On the contrary, it will not be so in
a system of legal proof-legally appraised evidence -where it is mainly the
law that weighs the evidence, not the tribunal of fact.
Likewise, many features of the methods for weighing evidence in
the Hispanic civil law system may resemble some institutions of the common law system. For instance, legal proof seems to be a system in which
the law overburdens the judge with rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions
of law concerning evidence. However, there are often nuances that make it
impossible to draw straightforward analogies. This explains why the aim of
this study is not to translate civil law concepts into those of the common
law, but to allow the English speaking reader to understand what the InterAmerican Court means when it refers to sound judicial discretion or to
some other analogous term.
It is also important to note that this study is not advocating in favor
of the Hispanic classification of the systems for weighing evidence. Similarly, this study does not intend to be a critique of these methods, even
though it follows the trend of considering sana crtica to be the most adequate among the Hispanic systems for weighing evidence. Indeed, sound
judicial discretion seems to be the method most widely supported by Hispanic scholarship. It is also the most similar to the common law system for
weighing evidence. In fact, it has even been asserted that the treatise on
judicial evidence extracted from the manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham 3 is
14
just a compilation of the rules of sana criica.
The concept of sana crftica appeared in the law for the first time in
1846, in the Spanish Reglatnento del Consejo Real [Rules of Procedure of
the Royal Council]. 5 This notion cannot be fully understood on its own,
without describing the different methods for weighing evidence as usually
classified in Hispanic and similar legal traditions.16 These systems would
13

M.

DUMoNr,

A

TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EvIDENCE, EXTRACTED FROM TifE MAN-

USCRIPTS OF JEREMY BENTHAM

14

ESQ. (1825).

NICETo ALCALA-ZAMORA Y CASTILLO,

EsTi

jDIOS DF DFRI(HO PROBATORIO 87

(1965).
15 Id. at 80. The use of sana critica is proposed in the Model Procedural Code for
Iberian-American States. See El C6digo Procesal Civil Modelo para lberoamdrica,
INSTiTUTO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERI(H(O PROC-SAL, available at http://www.iidp.

org/index.cgi'?wid-seccion=6&widitem=13# (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
16
Examples of this classification can be found in the work of the Italian scholar
Lessona and of the Spanish scholar Alcal. Zamora. See CARI.OS LESSONA, TEORfA
GENERAl

DE LA PRUEBA EN DERECHO CIVIL

355 (1957):

ALCALA-ZAMORA Y

CAS-
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be: legal proof,1 7 free conviction, 1" and rational persuasion. Some legal
scholars consider these systems to be two: legal proof and free proof, subdividing the latter into two different systems, free conviction and rational persuasion, 19 if subdividing them at all. 20 Sana crftica is the Spanish concept
used to refer to the system of rational persuasion. 2' This study will follow
the understanding that there are three Hispanic systems for weighing
2
evidence.'
The systems for assessing the weight of evidence are relevant only
once the means of evidence have been admitted into a particular proceedsupra note 14, at 32. The names given to these three methods vary between
the writings of different scholars. In the context of the Inter-American Court these
systems are referenced in Alberto Bovino, Evidential Issues Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2 SUR INT'L J.HuM. RTS. 56. 65-66 (2005).
17 In Spanish it is usually called either prueba legal [legal proof] or prueba tasada
[appraised evidence]. Probably the concept -'legally appraised evidence" better reflects the content of this system.
,8 Some scholars have used the concept of "intimate conviction" (Bo\ ino. supra
note 16, at 65), but it may give rise to confusion with the French concept of intime
COn ictionl. Two different understandings of this French concept can be found in
Christoph Engel, Preponderanceof the Evidenct, Versus Intime Conviction: A Be-

TILLO.

havioral Perspective on a Conflict Between Amnerican and Continental European

Law, 33 Vermont Law Review 435 (2009), and in Michele Taruffo. supra note 6. at
667. Engel considers it to be a standard of proof, while Taruffo seems to consider it
to be a system for evaluating evidence, in a broad sense.
19 This is described by the following authors, even though they do not use the
twofold classification themselves: H6ctor Fix-Zamudio, Orden v Valoraci6n de las
Pruebas en la Funcidn Contenciosa de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, in I
"F,((ION

MEMORIA

)1 . SEMINARIO: EL SISTEMA INTERA %I RICANO DE PRO-

)1 tOS DERI'Clios HtuMANOS EN EL UMBRAL 1)1I.

SIGLO

XXI 197, 202

(2003), available at http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/5/2454/12.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2012): and AICALA-ZAMORA Y CASTILO, supra note 14. at 32. The
latter classifies these methods as four, adding trial by ordeal to the previously referred methods. He considers the ordeal to be a historical method for evaluating
evidence. Id. at 33-35. This assertion is arguable.
211 For example, Alfredo V6clez Mariconde considers that free conviction and sana
crtica are the same. ALFREI)() Vi I-FZ MARICONI)i , 2 Di-RECHO PROCt S,.I PE-.NAL,
198, quoted in Maria Auxiliadora Solano Monge, La PruebaPericialante la Corte
hIeratnericoaa de I)erechos Humanos, 5 ILSA J.INT'L & COMP. L. 651 n.6
(1999).
21

AI.CAILA-ZAIORA

Y CASriI.I (), supra

note 14. at 49-50.

This account excludes mixed methods. Q' id. at 32. It will also exclude other
non-mainstream systems that some authors consider to be methods for evaluating
evidence. See sitpra note 19.
22

2012

SANA CRITICA

199

Systems for Weighing Evidence According to Some
Hispanic Scholarship
Free Proof
1.Legal Proof

2. Free Conviction

3. Rational Persuasion

lsana Critica
ing. Thus, they do not refer to the admissibility requirements that evidence
has to meet in order to be accepted, which are considered before the evidence is weighed.23 Similarly, these systems refer to the weight of evidence,
not to which party has to prove an issue, so they do not directly affect the
burden of proof.24 Finally, the systems for weighing evidence cannot be
equated with the standards of proof required for proving a particular fact,
since the latter refer to the degree of conviction which the judge is required
to have after applying the rules for weighing evidence.
Unfortunately, it is easy to confuse the notions of the weight of
evidence and of the standard of proof when one of these two concepts is not
clearly established in a given legal system. According to Taruffo, this happens in Spanish civil cases, where sana cr'tica is, generally speaking, the
system for weighing evidence, but at the same time "no specific standards
of proof are prescribed." 25 On the contrary, the contrast between the stanKarl H. Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence
Rules Under the Common Law System and the Civil Law System of "Free Proof"
in the German Code of'CriminalProcedure,16 BUFF. L. RFv. 122, 155-56 (1966);
23

and Gonzdlez Castillo, supra note 4, at 99.
24 Gonzilez Castillo, supra note 4, at 99.
25 Taruffo, supra note 6, at 668-669. Bovino notes the difference between standards of proof and systems for assessing evidence, since he states that sound judicial discretion in domestic criminal procedures has to be applied together with a
high evidentiary standard. See Bovino, supranote 16, at 69. The English version of
some Inter-American Court case decisions refer explicitly to the concept of standards of proof (e.g. Velisquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4,
126-128 (July 29, 1988), and Godfnez-Cruz v. Honduras, Merits,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5,
132-134 (Jan. 20, 1989)), but this expression
seems to be an error of translation, so it will not be of great help for showing the
difference between the concepts of sound judicial discretion and standards of proof.
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dards of proof and the systems for assessing evidence is illustrated by legal
systems employing both concepts. For instance, juries may be asked to decide a case with a conviction beyond any reasonable doubt-a standard of
proof-and at the same time could be acting according to the system of free
26
conviction-a system for weighing evidence.
II. LF.EGAI. PROOF AND FREE
A.

CONVICTION

Legal Proof

The practical importance of the method of legal proof is currently
very slight. In this system there will be "rules determining in general and
binding terms the probative force of specific items of evidence." 27 In other
words, "the evaluation by the fact-finder [is] governed by strict rules attributing certain quantities of weight to any given evidentiary item." ' 8 This
system could either prevent the judge from issuing a decision of which he
or she was convinced, e.g. because of the application of a rule such as testis
unus testis nullus [one witness [is] no witness], 29 or force him or her to
issue a decision in a particular way when there was a fll proof. The system
of legally appraised evidence was widely applied before the modem theory
of the separation of powers came into operation, and it was used in the
Spanish, French, and German traditions of civil law. 30 The paradigmatic
example of this system is found in the conclusive evidentiary value of confession, which is still in force in some domestic legal systems. 3
It could be argued that a system of legal proof contains implicitly a standard of
proof, because the referred system orders judges to issue a particular judgment
whenever there is.full proof (this concept will be explained later on in this paper).
At least in theory, judges in a legal proof system would follow an almost mathematical method for deciding whether there was fidl proof in a particular case. This

arithmetic procedure could be seen as a given standard of proof. C'. Kunert. supra
note 23, at 144-145, who refers to this arithmetic procedure.
2, Likewise, the Chilean Criminal Procedure Code establishes that 'judges should
use the system of sound judicial discretion, but also that they should reach their
decisions applying the beyond reasonable doubt standard. C(MIGO PROCSAl_ PENAL [C)D. PROC. PI.N.] as amended, arts. 297, 340, respectively (Chile).
27 Taruffo, su/pra note 6, at 666.
28 Kunert, supra note 23, at 123-24.
29 An example of which will be gixen in the next paragraph when referring to Las
Siete Partidas.
30 This ,ystem is called preulve Ilegale in the French tradition and gesetzliche
beweistheorie in the German tradition. Kunert, supra note 23, at 123.
31 An example is given by Article 1713(1) of the Chilean Civil Code, which provides that confession generates ful proqf. CoDio Civil. [CC], as amended (Chile).
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The system of legal proof finds its origins in the notion of the judge
as a civil servant of the ruler.2 It "was politically and sociologically inspired by the desire to restrain the judge's power, which was to be achieved
by making him an executor of prescribed rules rather than the decisive factor in a legal proceeding." '- The paramount importance of legal proof in the
Hispanic system goes back to at least the thirteenth century, with the Siete
Partidasof King Alfonso X of Castile and Leon, a legal source that had a
fundamental influence on the legislation of the American colonies of
Spain.34 The law XXXII of title XVI of the Third Partida of this legal
corpus gives an exquisite example of legally appraised evidence, hence, this
paper prefers to quote it in extenso:
Two witnesses of good reputation and who are in such a
character that they can not be excluded for the reasons ordered by the laws of this our book, are sufficient to prove
every case in court, except one involving the discharge of a
debt of which a record had been made by a notary public.
For where a debtor desires to prove that he has paid such a
debt, and that he has been released by the party to whom he
owed it, he must establish this by competent written evidence, or by five witnesses who state that they were present
when the said payment or release was made, and that they
were summoned or asked to be witnesses to the fact.
We also decree that a will, in which anyone was appointed
an heir must be proved by seven witnesses requested to act
The exposition of motives of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure of' 2000 explicitly states that it purported to end with the legal conclusive weight given to confession. Liv DE ENJUiCIAMIENTO Civil. [L.E. Civ.l, Exposicidn de Motiv'os No. XI
(Spain). However, Article 316(1) did not rely completely on the judge's sensibility,
and explicitly provided that the tribunal shall consider as true the facts acknowledged by a party, as long as they are in prejudice to the acknowledging party and
are not contradicted by other means of evidence. Id. art. 316(1). This provision of
the L.E. Civ. is logical, and so much so, that even if this rule were not in force, a
decision denying this weight to confession could probably be reversed on appeal.
Nevertheless, by providing this rule by law, instead of leaving this decision to the
judge's sensibility, legislators reflect that their reasoning may be still influenced by
a legal proof understanding of the evaluation of evidence.
32 Kunert, supra note 23, at 144.
33

Id.

The composition of the Partidasbegan in 1256 and was most likely finished in
1265. At iNSO X, I LAS SIr ,.PARTIDAS: Tin; MEDIEVAL CHURCH xxxv-xxxvi
(Robert I. Burns, S.J. ed, Samuel Parsons Scott trans., Univ. of Pa. Press 2001).
34
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as such. If the party who made the will was blind, it must
be proved by eight witnesses. Any other will, containing
bequests, in which a party was not made an heir will be
sufficiently proved by five witnesses. But we decree that no
agreement can be proved by one witness, no matter how
good and honorable a man he may be, although a strong
presumption will arise as to the act concerning which he
testifies.5 Where, however, an emperor or a king gives testimony concerning any matter, we decree that this will be
sufficient to prove every case; for every man should consider that he who is appointed to maintain the country in
justice and in right would not state anything but truth in his
testimony, or desire, in an instance of this kind, to assist
one person in order to embarrass another. We also decree
that a judge shall not permit any of the parties to introduce
in court more than a dozen witnesses in one suit, for we
hold that this number is sufficient for him who summons
36
them to prove his case.

Since the system of legal proof was widely used during the times of
the inquisitorial procedure-which at times revealed the uttermost expression of judicial powers-it has been asserted that this system was used for
limiting judicial despotism. 3 7 However, it is difficult to know whether the
overall effect of legal proof was to control or to cause some judicial excesses of the inquisitorial system. This, because the establishment of confession as a legally conclusive evidence may have encouraged, in some
inquisitorial procedures of the Middle Ages, torturing the accused as a
means of obtaining confession.3 8 This system of legal proof was modified
and later liberalized. 39 Its importance declined after the French Revolution,
when it was abolished for criminal law cases in France.4 11In Germany, this
system was abolished for criminal cases in the mid-nineteenth century.4 '
This is an example of the rule testis units testis nullus.
36 Ai.FONSO X, 3 LAS SITi. PARTIDAS: MEDIEVAl LAW, LIw XXXII, 679 (Robert
I. Burns, S.J. ed., Samuel Parsons Scott trans., Univ. of Pa. Press 2001).
17 AiCALA-ZAMORA Y CAsYi .-.
0, supra note 14. at 37.
38
Kunert, supra note 23. at 145.
35

According to Kunert, it lasted until the French Revolution in France. and until
the middle of the nineteenth century in Germany. Id. at 144.
40 Id. at 146.
39

41

Ii.
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In a system of legal proof, the law will consider some evidence to
be fdl proof' a concept used to refer to legally established conclusive evidence, e.g. the testimony of two trustworthy witnesses.4 2 If there was no
singlefullproof in a case, the law purported to oblige the tribunal to judge
in a way that could be considered "an almost entirely arithmetic procedure, 43 adding the evidence which was legally considered to be hall, more
than half' or less than half'proof, 44 in order to reach the amount of evidence
required for deciding a case. However, the law's "efforts could never banish
judicial discretion entirely from the evaluating process." 4 5 This was so because often these rules of legal proof would include in their terms some
concepts open to interpretation by the judge, e.g., trustworthy confession or
suspect witness. 4'
At this point it is interesting to note that the Inter-American tribunal
has at times used the conceptfidl evidence orfidl proof The Court has done
so when stating that it will not consider a single item of evidence to be full
proof', as in Bulacio v. Argentina and in Gdmez-Paquivauri Brothers v.
Peru. 4 The Inter-American tribunal's use of the concept of fil proof is
very infrequent, and is not necessarily linked with the system of legally
appraised evidence. For instance, in Cabrera-Garcia& Montiel Flores v.
Mexico the Court used the concept of pruebaplena [full evidence] as referring to a standard of proof: the Inter-American tribunal stated that domestic
42
-3

This is only an example, since this rule may not exist in some systems.
Kunert, supra note 23. at 145.

Id. This author gives some examples of evidence with this weight. See also
supra note 16, at 362 (referencing only the distinction between full and
halffull proof).
- Kunert, supra note 23, at 145.
46
Id. at 145. For instance, the third rule for weighing witness statements under
Article 384 of the Chilean Civil Procedure Code-the reform of which is currently
44

LESSONA,

under consideration-provides: "When the declarations of witnesses presented by
one party are in contradiction to those of witnesses presented by the other, [the
Courts] will consider to be truth what is declared by those who, even being fewer,
seem to be saying the truth because they have a better knowledge of the facts, or
because they have a better reputation, are more impartial and truthful, or because
their declarations match better with the rest of the evidence in the case." CoDIGO DE
PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [CPC], as amended (Chile) (author's translation). This
could even be considered a half-way point between the rigid system of legal proof
and the more flexible system of rational persuasion.
17
G6mez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, 1 56 (July 8, 2004); Bulacio v. Argentina,
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No. 100, 62
(Sep. 18, 2003).
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courts required ill proof before convicting an accused .4 Something similar
was done in the Cantoral-Benavidesv. Peru case, where the Court stated
that this State violated the presumption of innocence by condemning Luis
Cantoral-Benavides without lull evidence.'4 In the recent Ferndndez-Ortega
case, the State of Mexico referred to the concept of prueba plena-it was
translated as "sufficient proof'-despite being aware that the Court evaluates the weight evidence according to the rules of sana critica.The State of
Mexico used this concept in a broad sense, arguing that the declarations of
the victim could not be considered as prueba plena, and that they should be
taken into account together with other elements. 0 This latter use of the
concept pruebaplena seems to be identifiable with the notion of conclusive
evidence.
According to Bovino, when the Court applies the presumption of
veracity to uncontested evidence, it endows it with a higher weight than
what it deserves. 5' In addition, he seems to imply that, when doing so, the
Court would be giving this kind of evidence the value of full proof.Granting this value, according to Bovino, would be a manifestation of the Court's
adoption of the system of legal proof in some cases.5 2 Accordingly, he considers this to mean that the Inter-American tribunal would apply the system
of sana crftica only in those cases in which there has not been full evidence.5 3 However, this paper has a different understanding.
Cabrera Garcia & Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary Objections, Merits.
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220. 1 138 (Nox.
26, 2010).
41 See Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, Merits. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C)
No. 69, 121 (Aug. 18, 2000).
50 Ferndindez-Ortega v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, 1 96 (Aug. 30. 2010).
51
An example would be Su6rez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 35, 1 30 (Nov. 12, 1997). Bovino, supra note 16, at 67-68.
52 Bovino. supra note 16, at 67-68, 71.
53 Id. Bovino states that the Court has a presumption of veracity of uncontroverted
evidence, whereby it would give conclusive weight to unchallenged means of evidence. He considers that this would imply adjudicating in accordance with the rules
of legal proof, because the Court would not be able to assess uncontroverted cvidence together with the rest of the body o' evidence. In other words, Bovino considers that by not contradicting evidence, the parties prevent the Court from applying
sound judicial discretion.
However, this is not so, because the Court applies this presumption of veracity only
when it considers facts to be proved according to the rules of logic and experience.
The Inter-American tribunal is not obliged by any external rule to give this conclusive weioht. Besides, the Court does not always state that uncontroverted evidence
48
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It is possible for a court to usc both a system of sana crftica and
one of legally appraised evidence at the same time regarding different issues. 54 However, the Inter-American Court does not do so. The weight of a
means of evidence can be given both by the law and by the judge's rationality. 55 As to the Inter-American Court, there is no external rule requiring the
tribunal to assign a particular weight to certain means of evidence. Therefore, if the Inter-American Court considers certain items of evidence to be
conclusive, it will do so only because the rules of logic and experience
make this desirable, excluding the application of legal proof.
As it was previously mentioned, the method of legal proof could be
understood by a common law lawyer as a system in which the law overburdens the judge with presumptions regarding evidence. However, presumptions are usually aimed at establishing the existence of an unknown
substantive fact, from a proven or admitted primary substantive fact that
usually entails the former, unless the presumption is established because of
a public policy concern. Presumptions may, in practice, give certain weight
to an item of evidence, which is why these two concepts are somewhat
connected. Nevertheless, they are generally aimed at proving the facts of a
case, not at establishing the value of evidence.
This contrasts with what happens in a system of legal proof whose
rules are not concerned with the substantial facts of the case, but with procedural facts. Nevertheless, a system of legal proof can still be compared
with a detailed and comprehensive system of irrebuttable presumptions
whose primary facts are the presentation of certain evidence.5 6 There are
also other concepts that have similarities with certain aspects of a system of
legal proof, as happens with corroborationrequirements, but they lack the

systemic or pervasive reach that characterizes a system of legal proof.
is enough tor proving a particular fact (e.g. De la Cruz-Flores v. Peru, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C). No. 115,

58 (Nov.

18, 2004)). The presumption of veracity could be interpreted as a procedural penalty established voluntarily by the Court in cases where the State refuses to provide

evidence, but not as a manifestation of the system of legal proof.
51 This happens in the Spanish Civil Procedure Code, where the law orders the
judge to weigh evidence in a legally appraised fashion in some cases, and using
sound judicial discretion in others. For an example of legal proof see art. 319 (1-2),
and for an example of sana critica see art. 348. L.E. Civ.
55 This is referred to in the note of the translator in LESSONA, supra note 16, at
363.
56 It has been said that irrebuttable presumptions "amount to no more than rules of
substantive law expressed, somewhat clumsily, in the language pertaining to pre-

sumptions."

ADRIAN KEANF, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE

636 (2000).
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Creating a system in which the legislator systematically prevents
judges from weighing evidence in the way they deem most appropriate
could give rise to issues concerning separation of powers. Undoubtedly, the
system of legal proof was largely adopted during the monarchical era, when
these concerns were not present for those who wielded power. Currently
there are some remnants of legally appraised evidence in some jurisdictions.
However, these vestiges are in force only in some limited areas of law or
are applicable to specific kinds of evidence. Thus, they give rise to no important concern regarding separation of powers in a civil law environment.
Notwithstanding this, Hispanic systems have gradually moved towards a
general application of the system of sound judicial discretion.
The system of legal proof reveals several defects: its rules may be
inflexible and could prevent the judge from issuing a reasonable judgment
in some cases; 57 it stems out of an unrealistic desire for predicting the outFor example, in some private matters it would be difficult to fulfill the rule of
testis runs testis nullus [one witness [is] no witness]. This is especially so because
close relatives are often not allowed to perform as witnesses in civil matters. Nevertheless. in some exceptional circumstances it may have the effect of aiding the
protection of human rights. For instance, the Inter-American Commission highlighted some of this system's benefits when tribunals are composed by a high num57

ber of unprepared judges. It did so in the context of the special tribunalscreated by

the Sandinista Government Junta of National Reconstruction, for trying crimes
"committed by members of the military, officials and civilian employees of the
previous regime, and any other individual, who, protected because of his or her
association with them, participated in the commission of crimes" The Commission
asserted: "Pursuant to this system of free evidence in the proceedings against former members of the National Guard and the so-called Somocists detainees the
members of the Special Tribunals were to evaluate the evidence and take it into
consideration-as the law states-'by assessing it according to their conscience,'
thereby posing another serious problem with respect to these trials. The members of
the tribunals, some of whom has [sic] no legal training, found that the law did not
say what evidence should be rejected, how the evidence should be presented or
what criterion should be used to evaluate it. Upon reviewing case files at the Special Tribunals, the Commission found many proofs that did not refer to the facts.
but instead were value judgments about the individuals or the facts under investigation." Furthermore, the Commission states that the "system of free evidence and the
free evaluations of that evidence, are procedures more conductive to judicial error
than the system of legal evidence. There is always room for some degree of judicial
error in the administration of justice, which must be controlled and avoided by
eliminating mechanisms which, by excess or defect, expose or induce judges to
commit more errors." Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Rep. on the Situation qftHuni. Rts.
in the Republic of'Nicaraua, ()EA/Ser.L/V/II.53, Doc. 25 (June 30, 1981 ), Chapter IV, ([l][D I & D 14, available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Nica8leng/
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come of a case once the input of evidence is established; and it reflects a
high mistrust in the capacity of the decision maker for coming to proper
conclusions in the absence of clear and specific legal controls. These shortcomings explain why legal proof is no longer the general rule for evaluating
the weight of evidence in civil law countries.
Another explanation for the lack of support of the legal proof system may be the termination of the political milieu in which these rules were
created. 5 However, some remnants of legal proof are maintained: for instance, several domestic laws state that contracts agreed before a public
notary have an important pre-established weight. 59 These remaining vestiges of legal proof tend to be fairly logicalF') since they aim at enshrining
what a reasonable judge would take into consideration when weighing
6
evidence. '
B.

Free Conviction

In contrast to the system of legal proof, the two remaining methods are not
subject to legal constraints for evaluating the weight of specific means of
evidence. This could be the reason why they have been at times classified
as two forms of a unique system for weighing evidence: the method of "free
evaluation." Among them, the system of free conviction is the most exTOC.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012). The Spanish version of this paragraph refers
to concepts pertaining to the system of legally appraised evidence, some of which
have been previously explained, e.g.,fill evidence and half full evidence (the relevant sentence states: ni con que criterio debfan de ser valoradas co/no pruebas
plenas, semniplenas, indiciarias o referenciales).
58 ALCALA-ZAMORA Y CASio.1 0, supra note 14, at 37-38.
59 For an example of a law giving conclusive weight to public documents see L.E.
Civ.. art. 319 (1-2).
60 Historically there have been important exceptions to this reasonability, e.g.

often the declaration of older people would be considered more valuable than that
of younger, and even worse, declarations of women would be considered less valuable than those of men. EDUARDO BONNIER, TRATADO TEORICO Y PRACTI'O DE LAS
PIUEBAS EN [I DERECHO Civil Y EN DEi.;C1[0 PENAL 352-353 (1902).
Examples of this system regarding confession can be seen in supra note 31. For
an example in the matter of witnesses see Article 384 of the Chilean Civil Procedure Code, the reform of which is currently under consideration. The second of the
rules enshrined in this Article provides that the statement of "two or more witnesses
agreeing in the fact and its essential circumstances, who have not been declared
unable to testify, legally examined and able to explain their sayings, will constitute
full evidence Iprueba plena] when their statement has not been rebutted by another
contradicting piece of evidence." C6Dio DF. PROCEDNMUIN'IO CIvIL [C.P.C.], as
amended, Art. 384 (Chile) (author's translation).
61

208

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 18

treme. Scholars define it as having two features. The first is that it could
allow judges to decide according only to their opinion or knowledge, without necessarily making reference to the evidence rendered before them at
trial. The second is that it does not require courts to explain their decisions
or how they assessed the evidence. 62 Only the former of these features
seems to be essential, distinguishing clearly free conviction from the two
63
other systems for evaluating the weight of evidence.
The previously described first feature is particularly radical, since it
could even allow a court to issue a decision contrary to what would follow
from the evidence presented in a case. Judges using free conviction could
take into consideration facts of which they are aware, e.g. foreign law, even
if no evidence is rendered on that particular issue. 64 Likewise, they could
place higher importance on perceptions based on the demeanor of witnesses. 65 This does not mean that judges using the system of free conviction
will adjudicate in an unreasonable fashion. Indeed, if the law or the parties
give some judges the power to evaluate evidence according to free convic66
tion, it is because these judges' prudence and honesty inspire confidence.
Therefore, even if judges using free conviction are not constrained by the
ordinary rules of evidence, they will usually follow them.
As has been mentioned, some legal scholars do not distinguish between free conviction and rational persuasion. This explains why, for in62

See Lit.SSONA, supra note 16, at 355. and Gonzilc/ Castillo. supra note 4 at 96.

It is possible to imagine a case in which a Court issues a decision without being
constrained by the evidence presented in trial-for instance, by applying private
technical knowledge of a particular area-and in which the Court explains how it
reached its decision. This case still seems to be a kind of adjudication according to
the system of free conviction. Likewise, it is also possible to imagine a situation in
which judges adjudicating in accordance with legal proof do not explain the
grounds for their decision. This would not transform this kind of adjudication into a
decision according to free conviction.
64 Foreign law and technical issues arc questions of fact, so they should be proven
in a case. In order to avoid having to present evidence on these matters, it could be
useful for the parties to give an expert arbitrator the power of free con iction regarding these issues.
65 For a study about the unreliability of demeanor see generally Olin Guy Wellborn Ill. Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. Rt..v. 1075 (1991) (discussing the role of demeanor in evidence).
66 If the parties give this power to judges, they must trust them in a way compara63

ble to when parties give judges the status of ex aequo et bono. Regarding this latter
concept see Leon Trakman, Ex Aequo et Bono: Demvsti.,ing an Ancient Concept.
8 Ciii. J.INTr'i L. 621 (2008). In fact, a judge allowed to evaluate evidence freely is

similar to a judge with a status of e. aequo et bono with regard to evidentiary law.
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stance, Solano Monge asserts that the Inter-American Court decides
according to free conviction or to sana critica.()7 1er statement does not
mean that she believes the Inter-American Court to be reaching its decision
according to fiee conviction in the sense provided in this paper. Solano
Monge understands that the Court is bound by the rules of rational persuasion. This can be perceived in her description of free conviction according
to V6lez Mariconde, who considers that evidence must be appreciated following "the rules of logic, psychology and experience,"'6 something similar
to what shall be said regarding the system of rational persuasion and soun
cr~tica. Therefore, there is no substantial conflict between the assertions of
this paper and opinions such as those of Solano Monge, only a semantic
difference.
Civil law scholars usually assert that juries use the system of free
conviction, 69 since jurors need not give reasons for their decisions, and can
weigh evidence in the way they deem most appropriate. If juries are allowed to nullify, they may even have the possibility of finding against the
proofs rendered in a trial. 70 This may also happen in practice when juries
have no expressly recognized dispensing power, but nevertheless acquit
against the evidence rendered in the trial. 71 Indeed, even if nullification is

68

Solano Monge, supra note 20, at 659.
Id. at 652, notc 6 (author's translation).

69

Alcali-Zamora considers that this method is used by juries and by the-cur-

67

rently extinct-Spanish tribunules de honor [honor tribunals]. AI CALA-ZAMORA Y
CASTIILO, supra note 14. at 44-46. Bovino has the same opinion regarding jurics.
Bovino, ,supra note 16, at 65. Some commentators used to opine that obliging
Spanish juries to give reasons for acquittals would violate the ruling principle of
free evaluation of evidence. See Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury S'steus:
The Cases of Spain and Russia, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. Pous. 233, 255 (1999). The
Spanish jury's use of libre convicci6n [free conviction] is acknowledged in the
explanatory statement of the relcvant law. Ley Orgdnica del Tribunal del Jurado, I
Los ciudadanos jurados (Ley Orgnica 5/1995, 1995) (Spain) available at http://
www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A- 1995-12095 (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
70 E.g., Maryland's Constitution explicitly accepts nullification in criminal cases.
MD. CONST., Dec. of Rights. art. 23. It is affirmed that the English jury "posscsscd

for at least three centuries the power to pardon the criminal sub rosa by acquitting
him against the weight of evidence." Mirjan Damagka, EvidentiarY Barriers to
Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure:A Comparative Study, 121 U.
PA. L. RE v. 506, 584 (1973).
7 1 Rubenstein considers that, despite the prohibition of Sparf v.United States (156
U.S. 51, 63 (1895)), U.S. juries are allowed to nullify. He states that "juries are free
to acquit against the evidence but are instructed in the strongest terms that they
cannot." Arie M. Rubenstein, Veredicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Mod-
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expressly forbidden and jurors are instructed in this regard, a strict control
of the jury's means of conviction is not feasible, since it is impossible to
check in an individual case whether jury instructions had their desired
effect.72

The tremendous leeway given to judges in this system makes their
judgments hardly accountable, allowing them to act in an arbitrary fashion.
This is why it would not be possible or fair to grant this power to professional judges. Thus, the importance of this system is mainly theoretical. In
the case of juries-if they were to be considered as judging according to the
rules of free conviction-the danger of arbitrariness is tackled by several
institutions, such as jury instructions, the requirement of a large number of
jurors in a case, and the need for unanimity or high majority of votes required for convicting an accused.
1II.

SANA CRITICA, THE HISPANIC EXPRESSION FOR

RATIONAL PERSUASION

A.

General Issues Regarding Sana Crftica

The aforementioned systems of legal proof and free conviction stand in
73
contrast to rational persuasion, also called rational assessment of evidence.
This system seems to be a compromise solution between rigidity and mistrust in judges, represented by the system of legal proof, and over-flexibility
and irresponsibility, represented by the system of free conviction. Judges
evaluating evidence according to the system of rational persuasion will
have no particular directives about how to weigh each means of evidence,
ern Jury Trial. 106 COLUM. L.

REV.

959, 985 (2006). The British Lord Justice Auld

considered that "[tihere are many, in particular the Bar, who fervently support what
they regard as the right of the jury to ignore their duty to return a verdict according
to the evidence and to acquit where they disapprove of the law or of the prosecution
in seeking to enforce it."

LORD JUSTICE AuLD, REVII W OF THE CRIMINAl COURTS

173 (The Stationery Office, London 2001) available at http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/chpt5.pdf (last visited Sept. 15,
OF ENGILAND AND WA!I.

REPORT

2012). This dispensing power has been used in the United Kingdom in "'ClivePontinig, and Randle and Pottlecases and, more recently, a number of acquittals in cases
of alleged criminal damage by anti-war and environmental campaigners cases. . ."
Id. at 174-176. While saying this, Lord Justice Auld regrets the lack of procedural
means to prevent the ability to issue a perverse verdict of acquittal. Id.
72 Engel, supra note 18, at 464.
73 This latter denomination (apreciacidnrazonada de la prueba [reasoned assessment of the cwidencel) is given in Ai CALA-ZAMORA Y CASTI 1., supra note 14, at
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but they have an obligation to do it according to the principles of reason.
This system may or may not coexist with flexible rules for admitting evidence.7 4 A Court may be free to both weigh and admit evidence, as happens
with the Inter-American tribunal, but this is not always the case. In fact, the
common law system for weighing evidence, which in general terms is similar to that of rational persuasion, often has strict rules of evidence
admissibility.
Scholars usually define sana crftica as a system in which the judge
has a duty to evaluate the weight of evidence according to both the rules of
logic and experience.7 5 This requirement seems to be aimed merely at requiring sensibility in the judges' appreciation of a case's evidence. This is
nothing new from a common law point of view, since it simply involves the
freedom of judges to weigh evidence according to reason. 76 However, it
makes an important difference in systems where legal proof used to be the
norm. Sema crftica's requirement to follow the rules of logic and experience
could be similar to what is asked of judges when taking judicial notice, but
with the difference that the latter is used when considering the facts of a
case, while the former is applied when weighing evidence. For instance, in
the matter of judicial notice ajudge will know that a period of two weeks is
not enough time for human gestation,7 7 and in the matter of weighing evidence ajudge will understand that a confession may not be reliable if there
is a real threat of undue pressure exercised on the accused.
Bovino makes the concept of sound judicial discretion seem broader than what
it is,
extending its flexibility to the rules for admitting evidence. Bovino, supra note

74

16, at 66.

These two demands-to follow the rules of logic and experience-are the basic
requirements of sound judicial discretion. Gonzfilez Castillo, supra note 4, at 95-98.
However, domestic legal systems might establish others, e.g.. Gonzfilez identifies a
third requirement according to a domestic legal system. Id. at 100. In the context of
the Inter-American Court see Fix-Zamudio, supra note 19, at 214. The German
system of freie Beweiswiirdigung [free evaluation of evidence] would allow, at
least in criminal cases, appeals "based on the alleged violation of rules of logic or
75

experience or of the laws of nature, and, in critical cases, even on the allegation that
a particular inference, though logically possible, violated the laws of probability."

Kunert, supra note 23, at 124.
In fact, the way in which a British scholar describes the process of weighing
evidence in the common law system is strikingly similar to the previously referred
76

requirement of sana crtica.He states that "[t]he assessment of the weight of evidence in the common law system is essentially a matter of common sense and
experience.
" KIANE, supra note 56, at 28.
77 Id. at 656.
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The mandate to follow the rules of logic and those commonly
drawn from experience is indirectly endorsed by the Inter-American Court,
which in several cases, after mentioning the concept of sound judicial discretion, asserts that it is "following the rules of logic and based on experience."7 1 Indeed, it can safely be said that whenever the Court asserts that it
is evaluating evidence according to the rules of logic and experience, it is
referring to the use of sana critica, even though it may not be utilizing this
79
concept explicitly.
Evidence has no legally pre-established weight in a system of sound
judicial discretion. However, this is not the same as to affirm that all means
of evidence will have the same value, as has been suggested 0 , because they
will have greater or lesser weight according to the rules of logic and experience. For instance, there will be no rule stating that a confession will entail
a ruling contrary to the person acknowledging his or her guilt-as was often
the case in legal proof systems-but rules of logic and those drawn from
experience will still suggest that a confession usually carries more weight
than the statement of a witness related to a party to the trial. Therefore, if
judges wish to give more weight to the latter, they should explain
why the
rules of logic and experience advise doing so. For instance, they may justify
their decision by saying that the person who confessed was probably subject
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Judgments of lower courts failing to follow the rules of logic and
experience could be reversed, and the best way for assessing this flaw is by
analyzing the grounds set forth in the very judgment. This could be the
reason why Hispanic legal scholars usually consider that a system of rational persuasion requires, rather than merely recommends, judges to exE.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits. Reparations
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. HR. (ser. C) No. 79, [ 89 (Aug. 31, 2001), and BaenaRicardo v. Panama, Merits. Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
78

(ser. C) No. 72, T 71 (Feb. 2, 2001). This reassurance is important. since in many
cases "a term which is used by international tribunals for a concept is identical to a
term for a municipal law concept, without the contents being identical." MOJTABA
KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATEi) Issts: A Srtt m ON EVIDENCE BEFORI
INII.RNArIONAi TIiUNALS 22 (1996).
79 E.g., Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ). Merits, Repara-

tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73. 50 (Feb. 5, 2001).
On the contrary, the Court is not being accurate when it refers to "the rules of

'competent analysis' and experience," since -'competent analysis" is one way in

which the Court refers to sana critica. Therefore, one concept would include the
other. Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No. 94, T 82 (June 21, 2002).
80

C:, Bovino, supra note 16, at 71, 76.
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plain the grounds on which they weighed evidence.8 1 It has even been said
that, in the context of rational persuasion, the judges' duty to explain their
evaluation of evidence is the only safeguard against rulings contrary to the
merits of a case. 2 The Inter-American Court has stated that the "duty to
state grounds is a guarantee linked to the proper administration of justice,
protecting the right of citizcns to be tried for the reasons provided by Law,
and gi ving credibility to the legal decisions adopted in the framework of a
democratic society.", ' This duty to provide explanations also binds international judges who use the system of sana cr(tica, even if-or particularly
because-they have no hierarchical superior, because they still have a duty
towards the parties of a case, and society at large, to justify how they
reached their decisions.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, when all the evidence points in the
same direction it is reasonable to consider that there is no need to explain
how each item of evidence affects the decision-making process. In this case
judges would only need to enumerate the evidence, unless there is prima
facie insufficient evidence for asserting a particular fact. The Inter-American Court tends to be especially methodic when describing the evidence
presented before it. Likewise, it is very clear when stating which items of
evidence are taken into consideration when proving a particular fact. However, there might be isolated exceptions to this practice, as occurred in the
Las Palmeras v. Colombia case, where the Inter-American Court did not list
the witnesses and expert witnesses who appeared at the public hearings of
84
the case.

"I

LESSONA,

supra note 16, at 363-364;

ALCALA-ZAMORA YCASTILLO,

supra note

14. at 51 (stating also that the system of free conviction would require the judge
only to enumerate the means of evidence rendered belore him or her, whereas sana
crtica would demand a thorough analysis of the evidence). and Gonzlez Castillo,
supra note 4. at 102-104. The Inter-American tribunal has defined grounds as "the
exteriorization of the reasoned justification that allows a conclusion to be reached."
Chaparro-Alvarez and Lapo-Ifiiguez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (sen. C) No. 170, 1 107 (Nov.
21, 2007).
82 LESSONX, supra note 16, at 364.
83
Apitz-Barbera ("First Court of Admin. Disputes") v. Venezuela, Preliminary
Objection, Merits. Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C
No. 182, 77 (Aug. 5, 2008).
84 Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
90, 1 25-26 (Dec. 6, 2001).
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Particular Commentaries on the Court's Use of Sana Crftica

As was mentioned earlier, sana crftica is the Hispanic concept used for
referring to the system of rational persuasion. Hence, it seems that judges of
the Inter-American tribunal, who predominantly come from the Hispanic
civil law tradition, used the concept of sana crftica as a means to express
their lack of legal constraints for evaluating the weight of specific items of
evidence," the freedom that international tribunals have for weighing evidence. This is why the Court has asserted that "international courts have the
power to appraise and assess the evidence according to the rules of [sana
crftica]." 6 Similarly, but without referring to the Hispanic concept of sound
judicial discretion, the European Court of Human Rights also asserts that in
its proceedings there are no "pre-determined formulae for its assessment" of
evidence, and that it "adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported
8 7
by the free evaluation of all evidence.."

The Inter-American Court usually claims to analyze the evidence
only once it is brought together "into a single body, considered a whole," '
a statement that conveys the idea of a tribunal affirming its freedom from
rules determining the weight of particular evidentiary items. The single
body of evidence referred to by the Court may include proofs rendered in
The Inter-American Court has asserted its flexibility for evaluating evidence
since its very first decision on the merits (see Velgisquez-Rodrfguez v.Honduras.
Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No. 4.T 127 (July 29. 1988)). and
continues asserting it (e.g. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin v.Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94.
65 (June 21, 2002) Cantos v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No. 97, 27 (Nov. 28, 2002)).
86 In the original the Court speaks about the rules of "competent analysis." which
is another way of translating the concept sana critica. Miguel Castro-Castro Prison
v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
160, T 184 (Nov. 25, 2006). Regarding the margin of discretion that international
tribunals have for the assessment of evidence see CHIi-rHARANJAN F AMERASINGItl,
EvIDENCr. IN INTERNATIONAl LIrIGATION 187-210 (2005). Regarding the
85

International Court of Justice's freedom for weighing eN idence see Shelton, supra
note 6,at 387.
87 Nachova and others v. Bulgaria (App. nos. 43577/98 & 43579/98) Eur. Ct. H.R.

[ 147 (July 6, 2005).
88 Acosta-Calder6n v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment. InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 129, 49 (June 24, 2005). Other examples are in Serrano-Cru/ Sisters v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120, T 46 (March 1,2005). and G6mez-Paquiyauri
Brothers v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 110, ]166 (July 8, 2004).
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different stages of the trial, for example, in the phase of preliminary objcctions.8"

Similarly, when different cases have been merged or accumulated,

this body of evidence will include the means of proof of all the cases that
have been merged, as in the case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamill

t'.

Trinidad and Tobago.9° Furthermore, the Court has even incorporated evidence rendered in a different case affecting the same State and dealing with
a similar issue, as happened in Durand & Ugarte v. Peru.9' Only once the
evidence has been gathered as a single body will the Court give different
weight to each piece of evidence in accordance with the rules of sound
judicial discretion, without the constraints of any legal proof.
In every contentious case before the Court there will be-at least in
theory-two rival positions, which will present opposing evidence in relation to particular matters. Thus, the Inter-American tribunal will often have
the duty under the rule of sana critica to state why it preferred some evidence over the other. In this case it is not enough just to make a list of the
rneans of evidence rendered before the Court.9 - If a tribunal does so, without addressing why it dismissed evidence pointing in a particular direction,
it would not be justifying its decision. If a court only lists the "proven facts"
of a case, making no particular reference to the means of evidence used for
89 E.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits. Reparations
and Costs, Inter-Am. C. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, J[98 (Aug. 31, 2001), and HerreraUlloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Series A No. 107, T 91 (July 2, 2004). The Court will also
use evidence rendered at the merits stage for deciding an issue at the reparations
stage. E.g., Bdimaca-Veldsquez v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs. Judgment.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No. 91, J[22 (Feb. 22, 2002). Originally this custom
was more noticeable, because the Court would issue a separate decision for each
stage of a particular case, whereas currently it usually renders a unique decision
regarding preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs.
90 Hilaire, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
78.
91 However, this situation was an incorporation of evidence motu proprio by the
Court. Durand & Ugarte v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C).
No. 68,
35, 38 (Aug. 16, 2000). Another example is Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Cmty v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 146, T 49 (Mar. 29, 2006). For a description of the requisites tor incor-

porating evidence from a different proceeding without violating the principle of due
process see
49 (2006).

ALiVARO PAJL DiAZ, LA PRUEBA

ANTICIPADA EN EL

PROCESO CIVIL

45-

supra note 14, at 51. The Court's decisions on
the merits usually have a chapter called "Evidence Assessment." but it deals mainly
with the admissibility of evidence, not with its evaluation according to the rules of
logic and experience.

92
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asserting them, it would be issuing a -black box" decision. It would be a
ruling in which the observer only knows the inputs and outputs-i.e., the
evidence presented by both parties and the final decision-but not the process whereby the conclusion was reached. 93 An example of this in the InterAmerican system is given by the Street Children case, 94 where the Court
did not explain which evidence was used for proving most of the facts. 95
Fortunately, this case was just an exception, since the Court usually gives
an account of the means of proof supporting each of its findings.
An example of a proper justification of the Inter-American tribunal's evaluation of evidence is the assessment of a witness's testimony in
the reparations' stage of Aloeboetoe v. Suriname. In this case the Court
stated the reasons why it gave no value to this declaration, which countered
other evidence on the same issue. 96 A display of the motives for dismissing
a witness's testimony should allow the observer to judge the Court's reasoning according to the rules of logic and the teachings of experience. By
way of contrast, an example of the Court's failure to give a proper justification of its reasons for preferring some evidence over the other can be found
in Serrano-CruzSisters v. El Salvador,97 where the applicants alleged the
abduction of two little girls by military forces while they were alone in the
midst of the wilderness. In this case there was conflicting evidence regarding the very existence of the girls.' However, instead of explicitly analyzThe system of free conviction is the only one allowing a "black box" reasoning.
See id.; Tarufib, supra note 6, at 667. Cf. Gonzzilez Castillo, supra note 4. at 104105.
94 Villagrin-Morales v. Guatemala (Street Children), Merits. Judgment. Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63. 1 76 ff (Nov. 19, 1999).
95 However. in this case it is possible to imply which evidence was used for proving many of the facts.
96 Aloeboetoc v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Judgment. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
93

(ser. C) No. 15, 158 (Sept. 10, 1993). In this case the Court considered that -the
manner in which that witness testified, his attitude during the hearing and the personality he revealed led the Court to develop an opinion of the witness that persuaded it to reject his testimony." The Court's rejection of this witness's testimony
was not a declaration of inadmissibility-which can also occur in a system of legal
proof but a 'judicial assessment of this declaration's evidentiary weight.
97 Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No. 120 (Mar. 1, 2005).
98 Id. For statements of witnesses related to the girls' family, against the existence
of the girls, see id. at 1 35 (4-7); 366. For evidence supporting the existence of the
girls-besides the declarations of some next of kin entitled to compensation- see
[ 36(7). 1[ 48(77), 102. Among this evidence, probably the most important were
the girls' baptismal records, even though their authenticity was not crystal clear.
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ing the competing evidence according to the rules of sound judicial
discretion, the Court dismissed the whole isstle by saying that the Salvado-

ran Ombudsman Office had specifically mentioned to the girls' case, understanding that this would prove their existence."" The Court did so without

even discussing the Ombudsman's rigorousness and independence or how
this body had reached its conclusions. The result reached by the Court may

be reasonable, but the issue at hand is the process whereby this result was
achieved.

In this regard, when reports of public or private bodies have a decisive influence in the Court's determination of some facts, as in the recent
Ferndndez-Ortegav.Mexico case, 01°1 it would be advisable for the Court to

issue a separate analysis of their independence and decision-making process. 01 The evidentiary value given to a report will be totally dependent on
the reliability of the body which renders it.

1, Serrano-Cruz Sisters, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120, 1 102.
100 Inthe Ferndndez-Ortega case the Court placed a very significant weight on a
report of the Secretar'ade la Mujer del estado de Guerrero (Woman's Secretariat
of the state of Guerrero) (FernSindez-Ortega v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections,
Merits. Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, 79
(Aug. 30, 2010)). The relevance of this report for the Court's decision is stressed in
Cabrera-Garcfa & Montiel-Flores v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, 85 (Nov. 26,
2010).
101 This study's consideration about the need of analyzing the body issuing a report
is similar to Faindez's assertion that the Commission should, when evaluating evidence, "objectively take into account the independence and impartiality of its
sourcc." FA( NDii/ LEDi SMA, supra note 8, at 405406. Another issue concerning
reports is that they are usually available not only in the case's file, but elsewhere
(e.g. the internet). However, when the Court cites them in its judgments, it tends to
pinpoint only the volume and page number of the case's file where this document is
included, not the page number of the actual document. This hinders the assessment
that academics and human rights advocates could make of the Court's rulings, since
it would be easier for them to have access to the reports directly than to the file of a
case. Thus, the Court should also refer to the page number of the quoted document.
Examples of the Court's practice can be seen in Gonzdilez ("Cotton Field") v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, IT[ 116-20, (Nov. 16, 2009), Ferndndez-Ortega, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 at 1 79. However, this is not always the case, as it
may be noted in Miguel Castro-CastroPrison v. Peru, where the Court does refer
to the relevant sections of the original document. Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160,
30 ff (Nov. 25. 2006). Another
matter that does not facilitate the assessment of the Inter-American Court's ruling
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The merits of these reports may benefit either the alleged victim or
the State. An example of the latter situation is given by the matter of provisional measures claimed in Four Ngibe Indigenous Communities and Their
Members regarding the Republic of Panama.10 2 The Court's decision on
this matter was criticized because of the importance given to a report issued
by the Defensor(a del Pueblo [Office for Civil Rights], 10 3 which was
favorable to the interests of the State." 4 This decision regards provisional
measures as opposed to a decision on the merits. However, it is nevertheless
useful for exemplifying cases in which reports are favorable to the State.
The foregoing commentary about giving weight to reports without
explicitly analyzing their objectivity does not intend to offer an evaluative
judgment of the merits or suitability of the said reports. Indeed, at times
they may be particularly useful for proving generalized violations of human
rights. These comments are designed merely to stress that the use of reports
whose aptness has not been explicitly assessed may result in a mistaken
account of the facts. The need for analysis of these reports is especially
relevant when they refer to the general human rights situation of a given
country, since they may be used in several future cases involving similar
situations. The lack of a proper analysis of reports used by the Court was
probably what motivated a complaint of the ad-hoc judge in the Mack
Chang v. Guatemala case.1°5
The Court has exceptionally described some features of the body
issuing a report, or of the report itself. In the Miguel Castro-CastroPrison
v. Peru case, prior to utilizing the final account of the Peruvian Commission
for Truth and Reconciliation, the Court described some of this body-s feais that this tribunal has not uploaded to its website the relevant writs and documents
of cases decided after 2008.
102 Four Ng6be Indigenous Cmtys., Order of the Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (May 28.
2010), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/inedidas/nvobe se 01 _ing.pdf
(last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
103 1d., e.g., at8
7,91 11 & 10 15.
104 At times these State agencies will have an opinion absolutely against the interests of the State. as it happened in Ticona-Estrada v. Bolivia case. where the national Ombudsman filed the case against the State. Merits. Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 191, $ 1 (Nov. 27, 2008).
105 Judge Martinez states that certain reports "'do not represent by themselves [the]
facts stated therein." Mack Chang \. Guatemala, Merits. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (scr. C) No. 101, $ Ii (Nov. 25, 2003) (Martfnez-G6l'ez, dissenting). The
Court did not base its findings exclusively on the reports alluded by the said opinion, there was also an acknowledgement of responsibility by the State. See id., at I
113. However, this criticism may have been avoided by analyzing the probative
value of the said reports.
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tures: how was it created, which were its ends, and how were its members
appointed.' ' , Similarly, in the recent Vera- Vera v. Ecutador case the Court
analyzed the weight of a report of the Inter-American Commission, which
was based on an in loco visit to Ecuador, but which did not provide further
data, surveys, or evidence about the situation under analysis. In this case,
the Court considered that this report was not enough for proving a particular
situation.")' This deliberation of the Court is appropriate, since it takes into
account the way in which the report was produced, before determining
08
whether it is reliable evidence.
An issue related with the foregoing is the determination of who has
the burden of claiming the lack of accuracy of the reports presented before
the Court. This matter has no simple answer. In cases where the Court itself
incorporates a report motu proprio, it is easier to state that the Inter-American tribunal has a duty to assess the objectivity and decision-making process of the body issuing this report. In the remaining cases, it is reasonable
to expect the interested party to complain about the unsuitability of this
evidence. However, the traditionally active role of the Inter-American tribunal when obtaining and evaluating evidence gives strong grounds for requiring the Court to analyze the objectivity of these reports, irrespective of
whether the parties present any objections to this evidence. This is especially so when these reports may have an impact on future cases.
Finally, since the Inter-American Court can weigh evidence freely,
as long as it follows the rules of sound judicial discretion, it may take into
consideration not only direct but also other admissible means of evidence.
In this regard, since its very first judgment on the merits, in the VeldsquezRodr4guc. '. Honduras case, the Inter-American Court has stated its power
to base its decisions on circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions.'0 9 The European Court has made a similar assertion." 0 When a Court
106

Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (scr. C) No. 160. 11

197(3-5).
107 Vera-Vera v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 224.
80-81 (May 19, 2011).
108 The suitability of the Commission's reports as evidence before the Court will
not be dealt with in this paper.
109 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 4, [130 (July 29, 1988). The Inter-American tribunal continues asserting its
possibility to do so, e.g., Villagrin-Moralcs v. Guatemala (Street Children), Merits.
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, 69 (Nov. 19, 1999).

110 In Jalloh v,.
German 'v the European Court states that it can use not only direct

evidence, but also evidence which comes about from "coexistence of sufficiently
strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of
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bases its judgment on indirect evidence, meeting an appropriate standard of
proof, its decisions will be as binding as if they were based on direct means
of evidence. Thus, the Inter-American tribunal's approach in the Gangaram-Panday v. Suriname case, where it granted the applicant only a
"nominal amount" of compensation and dismissed the request for an award
of costs, simply because it reached its conclusion by inference, seems inadequate.'II Indeed, there is no reason for the Inter-American tribunal to grant
different kinds or amounts of compensation according to the way in which
it reaches a decision. Fortunately this approach was not maintained in later
jurisprudence of the Court.
CONCUSION

The concept of sana crtica [sound judicial discretion] has a clear meaning
in Hispanic civil law. It refers to one of the different ways in which courts
can weigh the evidence rendered in a case. This system allows judges to
assess evidence without being constrained by norms of legal proof. At the
same time, it requires adjudicators to judge in accordance with the rules of
reason and experience, and to state the grounds for their evaluation of the
weight of evidence. Sound judicial discretion represents a midway point
between rigidity and mistrust in judges, reflected in the system of legal
proof, and over-flexibility and irresponsibility, reflected in the system of
free conviction.
Usually the Inter-American tribunal states that its assessment of evidence follows the system of sana critica. However, the varying translations
of this concept have probably not suggested the reader of the English version of the Court's case law to enquire into the content of sana crftica.
Giving diverse names to this notion may be the result of the Court's lack of
a permanent office in charge of translating documents, which may be, in
turn, due to this tribunal's lack of funding. Nevertheless, the Court should
aim at being consistent when translating the concept of sana critica into
English, in order to make the reader of this version of the Inter-American
tribunal's case law accustomed with a single notion.
The Inter-American Court understands the concept of sana crftica
and has generally made an appropriate use of it. Particularly praiseworthy is
this tribunal's account of the means of evidence supporting each one of its
findings. However, as to the Court's duty to explain how it weighed the
evidence rendered before it, there are cases of both good and defective exfact." 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., [ 67, hlttp://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ (search for
"Jalloh v. Germany") (last visited Sept. 21. 2012).
I Gangaram-Panday v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment. Inter-Am. Ci. H.R. (ser. C) No. 16, $T 70-71 (Jan. 21, 1994).
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planations. Examples of the latter are cases where the Court places important ev identiary weight on reports of governmental or non-governmental
organizations, without commenting on their independence or on the rigorousness of their decision-making process. Thus, even though there is a generally positive application of sana crftica by the Court, there is still some
scope for improvement.

